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NoTEs ON SELF INCRIUINATION

the state's power to search and seize under valid search warrants. This
would be a change in the law, at least on the federal level.
It is believed that such a solution reaches a workable balance between the right of organized society to protect itself and the inherent
rights of individuals so dear to a freedom-loving people.
Tom SoYAI~s

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-SELF-INCRIMINATION-SCIENTIFIC
TESTS OF BODY SUBSTANCES AS EVIDENCE'
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
provides that no person accused of crime shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself. Most of the states,2 in somewhat varying language within their constitutions, 3 also provide such protection against
self-incrimination. 4 In recent years the courts throughout the United
States have had to face the problem of whether this privilege against
self-incrimination extends beyond the historic concept of testimonial
compulsion and the compulsory production of papers in open court 5
to cover non-testimonial, physical evidence of crime. The specific
types of non-testimonial, physical evidence selected for treatment herein13 are the scientific tests of body substances, such as blood, urine
and stomach contents. Since the very nature of these tests requires an
invasion of the bodily security (extraction of body fluids), the privilege against self-incrimination usually appears appropriate to defense
attorneys as the basis for an objection to the use of such tests.7 The
purpose of this note, therefore, will be to consider whether the use of
evidence obtained by such procedure is prohibited by the privilege
against self-incrimination.
1 The validity and accuracy of such tests are not within the scope of this
paper. See Gibson and Ladd, Legal-Medical Aspects of Blood Tests To Determine
Intoxication. 29 VA. L. REV. 749 (1943).
2 New Jersey and Iowa have no constitutional provisions pertaining to selfincrimination, but they do have statutory provisions which cover the "privilege".
See 8 ViGMonE, EvmENCE sec. 2252, p. 320 (3d ed. 1940).
3 Typical of such language variation is Kentucky's Constitution which states,
"In all criminal prosecutions the accused... cannot be compelled to give evidence
against himself .. " CONSTITUTION OF KENTUCKY, See. 11 (1893).
4 Wigmore points out that the varying language is of no significance since all
the phrases bad a common conception m me common law. 8 WiGmoRE, EvIDENcE
362 (3d ed. 1940).
5 8 WiMornE, EVDENCE 363 (3d ed. 1940).
0 Other types of non-testimonial evidence will not be discussed, except as
they incidentally involve body substance tests.
7 Mamet, Constitutionality of Compulsory Chemical Tests To Determine Alcoholic Intoxication, 36 J. OF CPms. LAw AND CuMIINOLOGY 132 (1945-46).
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It is believed that this purpose can best be accomplished by an
analysis based on three divergent views s as to the scope of the privilege. The first view, based upon the historical approach, would limit
the privilege to oral testimony and the compulsory production of
documents in court by judicial process. The second theory, which a
few jurisdictions have accepted, is that any evidence secured by compulsion from the accused is within the protection against self-incrimination. The third view, which attempts a compromise between the two
other views, would draw a line between enforced passivity and enforced activity on the part of the accused in the securing of evidence

from him.
1.

SmRicr VIEw DERIVED

FROM TH HIsTORICAL
PROBLEM

APPROACH TO THE

Dean Wigmore, the foremost exponent of strict adherence to the
historic development of the privilege against self-incrimination, in his
discussion of the scope of the privilege, states,
Looking back at the history of the privilege and the spirit
of the struggle by which its establishment came about, the object of
the protection seems plain. It is the employment of legal process to
extract from the person's own lips an admission of his guilt, which
will thus take the place of other evidence. Such was the process of
the ecclesiastical Court, as opposed through two centuries,-the inquisitorial method of putting the accused upon his oath, in order to
supply the lack of the required two witnesses. Such was the complaint of Lilburn 9 and his fellow-objectors, that he ought to be convicted by other evidence and not by his own forced confession upon
oath.

.. In other words, it is not merely any and every compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, in history and in the constitutional definitions, but testimonial compulsion. The one idea is as
essential as the other.
The general principle, therefore, in regard to the form of
the protected disclosure, may be said to be this: The privilege protects a person from any disclosure sought by legal process against him
as a witness. 10

It is evident from the foregoing quotation that Wigmore's interpretation of the historical approach" to the protection against self-incrimi8

McCoRMwcK, EVmENCE sec. 126, p. 263 (1954).

Inferences of such di-

vergent views appear in: State v. Cram, 176 Ore. 577, 160 P. 2d 283 (1945), and
Green Lake County v. Domes, 247 Wis. 90, 18 N.W. 2d 848 (1945).
9 Lilburn's Trial, 3 How. St. Tr. 1315 (1638).
10 Supra note 4.
11 For other discussions of the history of the "privilege" which agree with
Wigmore's interpretation see: 1 GEE NLEAF, EVmENcE see. 469 e (16th ed. 1899);
Inbau, Self Incrimination-What Can An Accused Person Be Compelled To Do?,
28 J. OF Crm. LAW AND CRIIMNOLOGY 261, 263 (1937-38).
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nation would extend this protection no further than testimonial compulsion (oral or written). 1 ' Hence, this view would allow no other
compelled conduct or its products, however unlawful or inadmissible
on other grounds, to be within the protection of this privilege. 13 The
historical approach to self-incrimination, as enunciated by Wigmore,
has rather wide acceptances in modem cases 14 and authorities. 15 Many
of the early cases avoid the issue of the constitutionality of these
chemical tests by finding that the accused waived his rights to the
protection against self-incrimination. 16 However, in recent years the
courts have shown a disinclination to rest the decision on waiver,
where it is apparent the accused was compelled to submit to the
17
tests.
One of the more recent cases to adopt the view that the primary
purpose of the privilege is to protect an accused from compulsory
testimonial utterances is People v. One 1941 Mercury Sedan.' s In that
decision the accused was compelled by bodily force to submit to a
stomach pump for the purpose of extracting swallowed capsules of
narcotics. The California Court, in allowing such evidence to be
used against the defendant, said,
In line with the weight of authority it is our opinion that
the privilege against self-incrimination does not preclude the introduction of physical disclosures the defendant is forced to make, or the
results of tests to which he has involuntarily submitted. It is our view
that the privilege only protects the individual from any forced disclosures by him,.whether oral or written. It is limited to the protection against testimonial compulsion. The privilege protects the
accused from the process of extracting from his own lips against his
will an admission of guilt, but it does not extend to the exclusion of
his body as evidence when such evidence may be relevant and material ....

19

12 Mamet, op. cit. supra note 7 at 140.
13 McCor1cK, op. cit. supra note 8, at 264.
14 2,5 A.L.R. 2d 1407.

15 Mamet, op. cit. supra note 7.
1 State v. Duguid, 50 Ariz. 276, 72 P. 2d 485 (1941); Novak v. District of
Columbia, 49 A. 2d 752 (1946); Touchton v. State, 154 Fla. 547, 18 So. 2d 752
(1944); State v. Werling, 284 Iowa 1109, 13 N.W. 2d 318 (1944); Gentry v.
Commonwealth, 215 Ky. 728, 286 S.W. 1041 (1926); State v. Alexander, 7 N.J.
585, 83 A. 2d 441 (1951).
17 The following cases found no waiver: Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165,
25 A.L.R. 2d 1396 (1952); Holt v. U.S., 218 U.S. 245 (1910); United States v.
Willis 85 F. Supp. 745 (1949); People v. One 1941 Mercury Sedan, 74 Cal. App.
199, 168 P. 2d443 (1946); Apodaca v. State, 140 Tex. Cr. 593, 146 S.W. 2d
381 (1941); Green Lake County v. Domes, 247 Wis. 90, 18 N.W. 2d 348 (1945).
1874 Cal. App. 199, 168 P. 2d 443 (1946).
19 Id., 168 P. 2d at 451. It should be noted that in a similar case in 1952
the United States Supreme Court reversed a conviction because excessive force
(stomach pump) had been used in violation of the "due process" clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
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It is apparent that a court following this view would not apply the
privilege to any type of physical evidence (blood or urine tests) no
matter how the evidence is acquired. The weight of authority20 in the
United States today, supports21the historic view as presented in People
v. One 1941 Mercury Sedan.
The American Law Institute Model Code of Evidence definitely accepts the view that the taking of body fluids is not within the privilege
against self-incrimination when it states:
No person has a privilege... to refuse

(b) to furnish or to permit the22 taking of samples of body fluids
or substances for analysis.

This rule would leave no doubt in the mind of future courts that
blood tests, urine tests, stomach pumps and any other chemical tests
of body substance should not be excluded on the basis of self-incrimination, since these tests are not in the nature of testimonial compulsion as
defined by history, for as has been pointed out, "What is obtained
from the accused by such action is not testimony about his body but
his body itself... "23
II-Vmiw THAT No EVIDENCE SECURED BY CoMPuLsIoN

Is ADmissmLE

A second theory to which a few jurisdictions have adhered is that
any evidence secured from the accused by means of compulsion is

within the prohibition against self-incrimination.2 4 It is clear that com25
pulsion is made the keynote of the privilege in this instance. Therefore, any type of evidence closely connected with the accused's body

such as blood, urine, stomach contents, etc., and which is taken by
force would be within the "prohibition". This approach erroneously
places its emphasis on compulsion rather than upon the testimonial
aspect of the protection against self-incrimination. Under such an in-

terpretation, the logical consequences would be disastrous to law enforcement for it is easily seen that such an analysis would necessarily
include such evidence as: fingerprints, photographs, '"ine-ups," meas20 Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910); United States v. Ong Siu
Hong 36 Phil. Is. 785 (1917); State v. Berg, 76 Ariz. 96, 259 P. 2d 261 (1953);
State v. Graham, 116 La. 779, 41 So. 90 (1906); City of Columbus v. Thompson,

55 Ohio L. Absc. 302, 89 N.E. 2d 604 (1949); State v. Gatton, 60 Ohio App. 192

20 N.E. 2d 265 (1938); Green Lake County v. Domes, 247 Wis. 90, 18 N.W. 2a

348 (1945).

note 18.
A.L.I. MODEL CODE: OF EVIDENCE, Rule 205 (1942). The comment to this
rule makes it clear that it leaves open the question whether any other rule of law
protects an accused from chemical tests of body substance.
23 8 WrcMoRE, EvIDENcE sec. 2265, . 375 (3d ed. 1940).
5 16 C.J. 566, 28 R.C.L. 434.
24 Supra note 8.
21 Supra
22
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urements, and compelled attendance in court. This interpretation
fails to consider that two elements, instead of one, are necessary to the
privilege, i.e., compulsion plus testimony. Certainly any reasonable
interpretation of this view would incorporate a concept of evidence
which goes beyond the limits of testimony.
Very few modem decisions can be found which, upon their
facts,23 promulgate this extreme view. Two older decisions which in-

dicate an acceptance of the compulsion view are State v. Height27 and
State v. Newcomb 28 which hold that the authorities cannot compel an
accused to submit to an examination for a venereal disease (rape
cases). Such decisions go to lengthy ends to show the evils of the use
of force but they fail to comprehend the full meaning of the privilege.
III-Vmw Wiucai MAKES A DISTINCrION BErVEEN AcrivE AND
PASSIVE CoNDucr ON THE PART OF THE AccusED

The third approach to self-incrimination attempts a compromise
between the two previous views on self-incrimination. 29 This approach
would distinguish those situations where the accused is compelled to
passively submit to tests and examinations from those situations in
which the accused is compelled to actively cooperate in the accomplishment of the chemical analysis of the body substances. Such a view
can draw upon no precedents from history but it does have moderate
support 30 in certain instances where the courts feel compelled to limit
to some extent the lengths to which the police may go in order to
obtain evidence from the accused. This theory makes an effort to
balance the interests of the individual against the interests of society
in having scientific methods of producing evidence. One authority indicates his general acceptance of this concept when he states,
Whenever the evidence is confined .

.

. to qualities of his

body substances beyond his power of control, its admissibility is
clearly justified by the more liberal interpretation of the Constitutional provision. Where, however, he is compelled to do acts which
he can use as a means of conveying ideas, the reception of evidence
20 A Texas case in 1941 indicated an acceptance of the "compulsion view",
but its facts make such an acceptance mere dictum. See Apodaca v. State, 140
Tex. Cr. 593, 146 S.W. 2d 381 (1941).
27 117 Iowa 650, 91 N.W. 935 (1902).
29 Supra note 8.
28 220 Mo. 54, 119 S.W. 405 (1909).
30
Allen v. State, 183 Md. 603, 39 A. 2d 820 (1944); State v. Cram, 176 Ore.
577, 160 P. 2d 283, 164 A.L.R. 952 (1945); Apodaca v. State, 140 Tex. Cr. 593,
146 S.W. 2d 381 (1941); Green Lake County v. Domes, 247 Wis. 90, 18 N.W.
2d 848 (1945). (The court indicated that a line did exist where it would be
improper to compel the accused to give physical evidence, but the court failed
to draw such a distinction); Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34
MNN~.L. REv. 1, 39 (1949).
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of his conduct raises serious questions as to the extent to which
practical considerations affecting efficient enforcement of the law
under modern conditions may be safely permitted to limit the right
of privacy and personal liberty. 3 1

The most prominent decision supporting the active-passive differentiation concept is Apodaca v. State.32 In this case the accused
was forced to undergo certain tests for intoxication which included
walking, finger-on-nose, and a urinanalysis. The court, quoting Ruling
Case Law, 33 based its decision on the belief that "the constitutional
inhibition is directed not merely to the giving of oral testimony, but
embraces as well the furnishing of evidence by other means than by
word of mouth, the divulging, in short, of any fact which the accused
has a right to hold secret."3 4 This decision is limited in the sense that
it does not indicate the type of evidence which would be allowed.
However, the inference in the case is that the evidence was inadmissible because "he was compelled to do the things required of him"3 5
and had he only been compelled to submit to these tests, a different
result would have been reached. A second significant case 30 which,
upon its facts, supports this third approach to self-incrimination is
State v. Cram.37 The court held admissible as evidence the results of
a blood-test for intoxication which was taken from the accused while
he was unconscious. It is obvious that the accused in this instance
was not compelled to act and hence this decision reached the proper
result under the passive concept of the third approach to the privilege.
It is apparent that those who advocate the distinction between
the active and passive conduct of the accused believe that the key to
self-incrimination is compulsion upon the individual to actively cooperate in an effort to incriminate himself. Again (as in View Two),
it is evident that a logical extension of this rule must necessarily bar
such evidence as walking a chalk line or standing in court for identification, for in each of these the defendant is called upon to act. A close
analysis of this compromise approach to self-incrimination shows tvo
inherent weaknesses. (1) There are factual situations where it would
be difficult to analyze the conduct of the accused as to active or
passive behavior. Such instances could involve urinalysis, lie detectors,
drunk-o-meters and truth serums. (2) If the active-passive line is
31

MORGAN, op. cit. supra note 80, at 89.

140 Tex. Cr. 593, 146 S.W. 2d 881 (1941).
28 RuLnNG CASE LAW 484.
3
4 Supra note 32, at 146 S.W. 2d 882.
35 Ibid.
36 The same results would have been reached if this case had been decided
under the "historic view". In fact the court did rest its decision on both the
historic and active-passive views.
37 176 Ore. 577, 160 P. 2d 288, 164 A.L.R. 952 (1954).
32
33
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strictly drawn, absurd conclusions may be reached. For instance, the
problem of admissibility would be decided differently in blood tests
(passive) and urine tests (active) when there is no substantive basis
for distinguishing the two tests. Another absurd result would be the
fact that a man could be subjected to catheterization but he could not
be forced to urinate into a bottle.
It cannot be denied that the active-passive criterion is helpful in
some instances but this writer believes that a more reasonable result
can be reached under the historical approach. In many instances these
two approaches will reach the same result 38 and will only diverge
when the active-passive distinction goes beyond its historical precedent
in the common law. Although helpful in some instances, the overall
result of this view is to cloud the issue.
IV-CONCLUSION

The writer, as a result of the above analysis of the three divergent
approaches to self-incrimination as it involves body substances, is
forced to the conclusion that the historical approach to self-incrimination is the sounder of the three views. This conclusion is based upon
two reasons, i.e., the historicalbackground of the privilege, and what
is thought to be sound public policy of today. 39 The remainder of this
note, therefore, will be concerned with the considerations of these two
reasons.
It is clear that an analysis of the historical development of the
protection of the accused from self-incrimination shows that such a
privilege arose essentially to protect a person from testimonial compulsion, i.e., the extraction of evidence from his lips. 40 This unique
privilege owes its beginning to the misuses of the inquisitional oath,
both in the ecclesiastical courts and in the Star Chamber.41 By 1620
Coke and the nonconformists had established that such oaths were unlawful in the ecclesiastical courts without formal accusation.4 2 However, it was Lilburn's Case and its aftermath which persuaded the
43
courts that an accused could not be compelled to disclose his guilt.
From this background the colonists incorporated provisions against
38 People v. One 1941 Mercury Sedan, Supra note 18; State v. Cram, Supra
note 37.
39 For a full discussion of the policy behind the "privilege" see, WIscoNsIN
BRANcH, AmERICAN INSTrrUE OF CmuNMIIAL LAW AND CRMNOLOGY; REPORT OF
THr COMt0TTrE ON TRIAL PROCEDURE (1910).
40 8 WIGmonE, EVIDENCE, 863 (3d Ed. 1940).
41 McCoIx=nCx, EVIDENCE, 254 (1954); 8 WIGmoE, EVIDENCE 217 et sec,
363 (3d ed. 1940).
42 MCCORLsIICK, op. cit. supra at 254; VIGMORE, op. cit. supra at 288.
43 NcCom'dncK, op. cit. supra at 254; WICGMOP, op. it. supra at 291.
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self-incrimination into their state constitutions in order to protect
themselves against testifying to incriminating facts. Therefore, it can
be seen that if such phrases as "witnessing against oneself' are viewed
within their historic evolution and the spirit which brought them
about, there can be little doubt that chemical tests involving body
substances are not within their meaning. As has been pointed out,
44
such evidence is not testimony about the body, but is the body itself.
The second basis for urging an acceptance of the historical interpretation of the privilege as against the other two approaches is
founded upon public policy. There are several policy reasons which
give full support to the Wigmore view.
First. The historical approach, unlike the other two concepts, has
no factual exceptions which tend to nullify the effectiveness of the
theory. As has been pointed out (supra) the passive-active criterion
will result in absurd results and distinctions and, like the compulsion
approach, a logical extension of this view would bar the most inoffensive evidence such as fingerprints.
Second. The privilege should be kept within the strictest limit
possible, 45 since there can be no doubt that the privilege is often a
refuge for criminals. To extend it beyond the necessary area (i.e., oral
and written testimony) needed to protect the innocent from an inquisitorial method of investigation would be to dangerously hamper
society in the apprehension of criminals. It is felt that there is no inherent danger to the accused for him to be subjected to an objective
scientific test of his body substance as there would be in case of oral
compulsion.
Third. The importance of using chemical tests to minimize crime
(such as drunken driving) outweighs relatively slight invasions of body
security. A recent article points out these conflicting interests: 4
The interests involved... are, on the one hand, the personal
interest of the accused in preserving his bodily integrity and the
social interest in framers of criminal procedure, and, on the other
hand, the interest of society in minimizing crime... and in reducing
the number of deaths widely presumed to be caused by drinking
drivers ....

That in many cases the courts have tipped the scales

on the side of admissibility of such evidence, when taken without
consent and with some force, indicates the apparent belief that the
invasion of bodily integrity is relatively slight and the interest of

society relatively large.
It is evident that an extension of the privilege against self-incrimination into the fields of physical evidence would be a great hindrance
44

W IGMIORE,

45 Id.at 318.

op. cit. supra at 375.

46 4 J. OF PUBLic LAw

202, 206 (Spring-1945).
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to reasonable law enforcement. The accused is forced to do many
other things while under arrest (appear in court, finger-print, lineups, etc.), hence it is submitted that no distinction should be drawn
so as to bar chemical tests from use as evidence. The prohibition of
any of these would render crime detection almost impossible.
Fourth. The privilege exists partly in order to stimulate the prosecution to a full and fair search for evidence procurable by its own
exertions rather than a reliance upon oral testimony extracted from
those accused of crime. It is evident that scientific tests of body substances do not violate this purpose, since such tests do not rely upon
the testimony of the accused but rather upon objective physical, nontestimonial substances.
Fifth. For those who fear that such an approach (described herein
as the historic view) leaves the door open for unreasonable police
tactics, it is suggested that the following remedies are available for
the protection of the accused:
(a) A civil suit for battery may be available against an officer who
47
abuses a person while under arrest.
(b) There is authority for the position that evidence obtained by
chemical tests may be barred as evidence obtained by "Illegal Search
and Seizure."48
(c) Excessive force in such tests may violate the "Due Process
Clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Consti-

tion.

40

Therefore, based upon history and policy, it is concluded that the
correct interpretation of the privilege against self-incrimination does
not protect an accused from being compelled to engage in scientific
tests of his body substances for the purpose of securing evidence to be
used in his criminal prosecution.
LuTm HoUsE
CONTRACTS-ACCEPTANCE OF AN OFFER-WHEN AN
ACCEPTANCE BY MAIL TAKES EFFECT
The law of contracts with regard to the need for communication
of the acceptance of an offer by mail was settled in England in 1818
by the case of Adams v. Lindsell.1 Through a process of historical
evolution, this case and its related cases established the doctrine that
47

Foote, Tort Remedies For Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MiNN.

L. RLv.
48 493 (April 1955).
State v. Weltha, 228 Iowa 519, 292 N.W. 148 (1940).

49 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 25 A.L.R. 2d 1396 (1952).
1 1 Bamewal & Alderson 681, 106 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B. 1818).

